So we didn't. What survived the pivot became Canon Therma — a printer that calibrates itself, and the subscription that makes it work.

We'd spent three months on home-based businesses — desk research, interviews, a picture of who these people were. Then Canon asked us to shift the target: established small businesses, with steady order volumes and real operations behind them.
Four weeks to research a new segment, land on a concept, build a business model, and present it to the client. The room's first reaction was that three months had just evaporated.
I didn't think it was gone. Home-based sellers and small businesses aren't different species — they're the same people at a different stage. What we'd learned about how someone runs an operation alone, without IT support, still held. What we had to re-learn was volume, cost of failure, and willingness to pay.
But I didn't want that to be an opinion. So I proposed we go and check.
Instead of running research and then design, I ran two tracks at once and used them to check each other.
I split all prior material across the team: our own three months of research plus the data Canon had shared with us. Everyone pulled out anything that might still hold for the new segment. The point wasn't to salvage the work, it was to find out how much of the foundation was still standing.
I went to small businesses in person, running guerrilla interviews on what actually hurts when they print. I also mined footage owners had filmed of themselves, posting their packing routines on YouTube and Instagram to promote the shop. Nobody is performing for a researcher in those clips, and the mess around the label printer looks the same on camera as it did in the room.

Fig. 1 — Re-sorting three months of prior research against what we were seeing in the shops.
That comparison is what bought us the time. Because the foundation held, we never had to rebuild it — we could research and design simultaneously instead of sequentially, and spend the four weeks going deeper rather than starting over.
Both tracks converged on the same answer to a basic question — why buy a printer at all?
That reframed the focus. I stopped asking about printers in general and pointed every remaining interview at three things: high-volume printing, efficiency, and workflow. And once we looked there, the same complaint kept surfacing — jams, and changing paper.
Every jam and every roll change pulls a person back to the machine by hand — right in the middle of the batch the machine was supposed to be handling for them. And each interruption burns labels.
One owner demonstrated a paper-size change in front of me: reload, realign, test print, adjust, test again — with a table already covered in scrapped labels.
Another had made herself a handwritten cheat sheet of every paper size, because nothing in the setup could tell her which roll was loaded.
Nobody described this as a problem. They'd absorbed it — built workarounds, made peace with it. People don't write cheat sheets for things that work. You don't hear this in an interview. You have to be in the room.
Fig. 2 — A real setup: rolls in every size, and nothing to tell you which one is loaded.
A small task, quietly taxing the whole week. That gap — 10% of the work, a daily interruption — became the case for building something.
Canon's brief required hardware. So we asked a narrower question: what has to change so a roll swap stops being an event?
Hardware was Canon's requirement. The consumables subscription was ours — and not as a way to make the numbers work. It's what makes the fix possible.
A roll change should require zero recalibration.
The paper has to identify itself: an RFID tag in every box.
The paper has to come from Canon. A subscription is the natural form of the fix, and it eliminates the waste at the same time.
Monthly delivery in the sizes a business actually uses, sized for roughly 300 packages a month, with plan tiers as volume grows. For the user: never running out, never recalibrating, ~400 fewer wasted labels a year. For Canon: recurring revenue at 68% margin on top of one-time hardware.
A subscription that exists only to bill you is a tax. A subscription that exists because the product doesn't work without it is a moat — and the customer feels the benefit every time they change a roll.
We didn't stop at a concept. The team built the full commercial case so Canon could judge it as a business, not a student idea.
Underneath: unit costs at 20,000-unit scale, bundle pricing, three subscription tiers, fixed-cost and breakeven assumptions, and a 12–15 month rollout across design finalisation, MVP and beta.
Market sizing and the financial model were led by a teammate; I owned the research and product direction that the model was built on.
This was a proposal, not a launch. Here's what I'd instrument if it shipped — and what would tell me we were wrong.
A pivot isn't a reset. When the target moved, the instinct in the room was that three months were gone. What was actually gone was one layer — the segment. The layer underneath, how these people work and why they buy, was still standing. Knowing which layer moved is what turned a crisis into four focused weeks.
Some problems have to be watched, not asked about. Nobody told us roll changes were a problem. They'd made cheat sheets instead. The insight that shaped the entire product came from standing in someone's workspace and noticing what they'd stopped complaining about.
